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For ten years, the National Bargaining Council for the Clothing Manufacturing 
Industry (NBC) has been used by the South African Clothing and Textile 
Workers Union (Sactwu) and by largely Cape Town-based employers to impose 
higher labour costs on „Chinese‟ employers in Newcastle, in northern KwaZulu-
Natal. Many Newcastle employers have failed to comply with the rising 
minimum wages and levies imposed by the Council. The struggle intensified in 
2010/11 when the NBC used the labour courts to put pressure on, and close 
down, targeted non-compliant firms, in response to which some employers 
initiated legal action against the Minister of Labour and the NBC. The struggle 
between the NBC and non-compliant firms is of broader importance because the 
non-compliant firms comprise the labour-intensive rump of the last remaining 
labour-intensive manufacturing sector in South Africa. Their fate draws our 
attention to the role of labour market policies and institutions (especially the 
process of minimum wage-setting through bargaining councils), trade 
liberalisation and industrial policy in determining the viability of labour-
intensive manufacturing. The Newcastle case shows how, under the guise of 
promoting „decent work‟ and the supposed levelling of the playing field for 
producers, an unholy coalition of a trade union, a group of employers and the 
state can initiate and drive a process of structural adjustment which undermines 
labour-intensive employment and exports South African jobs to lower-wage 















Successive South African government plans have emphasised the need for job 
creation, yet neither the „New Growth Path‟ (RSA, 2010) nor the „National 
Development Plan‟ (RSA, 2011) has grasped the nettle of what it takes to allow 
labour-intensive growth. The former emphasises „decent work‟ (i.e. high-
productivity, high-wage jobs), whilst the latter claims that South Africa‟s 
manufacturing strength lies in capital-intensive industries, noting forlornly that 
„in a context of high unemployment, growth would ideally be sourced through 
expanded contribution of labour‟ but that „to compete, the country‟s cost 
structure requires an emphasis on productivity, products and logistics‟ (2011: 
126). No attention is given to how South Africa‟s wage-setting institutions 
themselves drive up labour costs, promoting capital-intensity and undermining 
the prospects for labour-intensive growth. Nowhere is this more evident than in 
the clothing industry.  
 
South Africa‟s clothing industry is in crisis. Squeezed between rising wage 
costs and intensifying international competition, employment has almost halved 
since 2003 (Nattrass and Seekings, 2012a). The most labour-intensive firms 
producing basic clothes for the mass market, in direct competition with China 
and other low-wage countries, have survived in South Africa by relocating to 
lower-wage regions and/or by paying less than the legal minimum wage. Some 
firms have relocated production to Lesotho, where minimum wages are 
substantially lower.  
 
The very existence of the rump of labour-intensive manufacturing in South 
Africa is now threatened by a „compliance drive‟ launched in 2010 by the 
National Bargaining Council for the Clothing Manufacturing Industry (NBC). 
The NBC‟s objective is to force all firms in the clothing industry to comply with 
the minimum wages agreed to by member employer associations and the South 
African Clothing and Textile Worker Union (Sactwu) in the Council. Firms that 
do not pay these minima -- as well as various levies to the NBC -- are pursued 
through the courts, served with compliance orders, demands for levies owed to 
the NBC and back-pay owed to workers, and eventually shut down by writs of 
execution served by the local sheriff.  
 
This situation has serious implications for the prospects of labour-intensive 
growth in the industry and in the country. Clothing is South Africa‟s most 
labour-intensive industrial sector. According to the 2008 manufacturing survey, 
capital invested per job created was R10 000 in clothing, while the average for 





accordingly lower, with average weekly wages (in 2008) of R696 in clothing 
compared to R918 in manufacturing generally. This is particularly true of wages 
in the most labour-intensive end of the sector, which are generally lower than 
those paid by more capital-intensive firms. The NBC‟s compliance drive is 
making it harder (if not impossible) to create jobs for relatively unskilled people 
in poorer regions -- with adverse consequences for poverty and inequality.    
 
The NBC was created in 2002 through the amalgamation of various regional 
bargaining councils, some of which were in a state of decline -- especially in 
KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) where employers were abandoning the existing, Durban-
based regional bargaining council in droves (Skinner and Valodia, 2002). 
Resisted from the outset by several employer bodies, especially in KZN 
(Anstey, 2004), the NBC has never been representative of firms. Only 10 per 
cent of KZN firms and only 24 per cent of all firms registered with the NBC are 
represented by employers‟ associations in the NBC and are therefore formally 
party to its agreements. „Party‟ firms tend to be larger than „non-party‟ firms 
(employing 114 workers on average in 2011 as opposed to 42) but employ less 
than half (47 per cent) of all workers in firms registered with the NBC (see 
Table 1).  
 
 
Table 1: Employment strength of the NBC as of 28/02/2011 
 Registered with the NBC KZN inclusive of known but 
unregistered firms*  Total South Africa KZN 
Employers party to the 
collective agreement 
232 (24.5%) 33 (9.8%) 33 (7.8%) 
Employers not party to the 
collective agreement  
716 (75.5%) 303 (90.2%) 303+89 = 395 (92.2%) 
Total employers 948 (100%) 336 (100%) 336+89 = 425 (100%) 
    
Workers in firms party to 
the collective agreement 
26 645 (47.1%) 6 741 (31.7%) 6 741 (26.0%) 
Workers in firms  not 
party to the agreement 
29 894 (52.9%) 14 521 (68.3%) 14 521+4 680=19 201 (74%) 
Total workers 56 539 (100%) 21 262 (100%) 25 942 (100%) 
Source: Data obtained from the NBC office in Cape Town: „Employment strength as at 28
th
 February 2011 and 
from the NBC-KZN. *According to the list of non-compliant firms (no date, but it appears to be from mid- to 
late 2010) there are 89 known but unregistered firms in KZN employing 4 680 workers. If we take these into 
account, these estimates for representivity for KZN in early 2011 can be derived.  
 
 
Given the many firms that have not registered with the NBC, these figures 
actually exaggerate the degree to which the NBC represents the clothing 
industry. According to the March 2011 Labour Force Survey conducted by 
Statistics South Africa, estimated total wage employment in the clothing 
industry was about 60 per cent higher than that recorded by the NBC, 
suggesting that there are large numbers of workers in unregistered firms. If one 





firms in KZN, collectively employing only 26 per cent of workers, were party to 
the 2011 NBC agreement. Despite this, successive Ministers of Labour have 
extended wage agreements to all clothing firms throughout South Africa, 




The employers in the NBC are dominated by the Cape Clothing Association 
which accounts for 39 per cent of party firms (almost all of which are metro-
based) and employs 55 per cent of the workers in party firms. The only 
significant employer association based outside of the metros is the Coastal 
Clothing Manufacturers Association whose members operate in KZN, but it 
represents a mere 7 per cent of party firms and has limited influence in the 
NBC. Sactwu, which was created in 1989 out of a series of mergers with 
regional unions, also has a strong Western Cape presence, though this has 
declined in recent years as a consequence of major retrenchments in the 
Western Cape and a small increase in membership in KZN.
2
   
 
In June 2011, five small clothing enterprises from Newcastle
3
, a low-wage 
region in KZN, launched a judicial review application
4
 requesting that the 
decision taken by the Minister of Labour to extend the 2011 NBC minimum 
wages to them be set aside. In the alternative, they sought to have declared 
unconstitutional portions of the Labour Relations Act (section 32 (3)) which 
permit the Minister to extend collective agreements without acting reasonably 
and having regard to the consequences for unemployment (Chen, 2011a). The 
case was scheduled to be heard on 29 January 2013. At stake is the survival of 
450 firms employing around 16 700 workers being targeted by the NBC in its 
compliance drive. This paper locates the Newcastle story within the broader 
context of South Africa‟s clothing industry and related industrial policy.  
  
 
Minimum Wages in South Africa’s Clothing Industry 
 
Since the first national minimum wage agreement in 2003, nominal and real 
minimum wages have risen significantly in low-wage, non-metro areas such as 
Newcastle (Figures 1 and 2). Prior to 2002/3, minimum wages in most parts of 
the country were negotiated by employers and unions in regional bargaining 
councils. Areas -- including Newcastle -- which were not covered by the 
                                                 
1
 Note that when the NBC‟s certificate of representivity expired in May 2012, the Minister of Labour did not 
renew it (Steyn, 2012) – so we may be witnessing a change in approach in this regard.  
2
 In 2003 Sactwu had 59 574 members of which 53 per cent were in the Western Cape. By January 2011, 
membership had dropped to 47 815 (of which 32 per cent were in the Western Cape).  Sactwu‟s membership in 
KZN rose from 25 per cent to 42 per cent over the same period--in part because the compliance drive increased 
registration of firms and as Sactwu mobilised workers on the issue.  
3
 And the United Clothing and Textile Association, whose head office is in Durban.   
4





regional bargaining councils were subject to minimum wages set by the Wage 
Board and subsequently by the Employment Conditions Commission (ECC).
5
 
Both the Wage Board and the ECC took account of the likely trade-off between 
wage and employment levels when setting minimum wages. Since 2003, 
minimum wage agreements in the NBC have been routinely extended to all 
employers by the Minister of Labour without further consideration of the impact 




Figure 1: Minimum wages in Cape Town and Newcastle 
 
 
                                                 
5
 In 1991, the Wage Board set minimum wages for clothing firms in South Africa (Wage Determination 471). 
The so-called independent bantustans were exempt until 1997 when the minimum wage was extended across 
South Africa. The Wage Board was replaced by the ECC, which regulated minimum wages in clothing between 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































Qualified machinist (Cape Town) 










Figure 1 shows that in 2000, minimum wages in the clothing industry in 
Newcastle were half those in Cape Town. By 2011, after nine years of wage 
agreements in the NBC, they were at two-thirds the Cape Town level. This was 
achieved by pushing up non-metro wages at a much faster rate. Indeed, as 
shown in Figure 2, real minimum wages in non-metro areas like Cape Town 
have barely kept abreast of inflation, although in dollar terms they rose from 
2002/03 in all regions, with adverse consequences for competitiveness across 
the industry. Sactwu wage negotiators have been prepared to sacrifice real wage 
growth in an effort to save jobs in Cape Town -- as they have themselves 
recognised
6
 -- whilst destroying jobs in non-metro areas such as Newcastle. 
 
Most of the employers represented in the NBC have gone along with the 
reduction of inter-regional differentials as this is of little consequence to them, 
at best protecting them from marginal future inroads into their markets. Indeed, 
for metro-based employers, the NBC may well have helped to constrain wage 
growth as Sactwu traded flat real wage growth in metro areas for higher 
minimum wage growth in non-metro areas.   
                                                 
6
 SACTWU Press Release, “SACTWU and NCMA sew together wage agreement”. 9
th
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Firms that are party to the NBC negotiations tend to produce for relatively 
protected niche markets (e.g. bespoke orders, promotional products) or the „fast 
fashion‟ end of the industry where margins are higher and where longer-term 
relations can be forged with retailers. For this reason, they are not threatened by 
competition from low-wage non-metro firms which produce clothes for 
different markets, notably the relatively simple skirts, shirts and pyjamas aimed 
at middle- and low-income consumers where branding is less important. Indeed, 
the regional dispersion of South Africa‟s clothing industry mirrors the spatial 
profile of global value-chains in which low-wage areas produce items for the 
mass market, and higher-wage firms in metro areas produce higher value-added 
items for better off consumers (Gibbon, 2004; Gibbon and Ponte, 2005; 
Rogerson, 2004; Skinner and Valodia, 2002; Nattrass and Seekings, 2012a, 
2012b). This is why the presence of low-wage firms does not inevitably result in 
a „race to the bottom‟ for the South African clothing sector as a whole. If it did, 
there would only be clothing factories in low-wage areas, and no jobs at all in 
Cape Town. 
 
Yet the NBC and the umbrella employers association -- the Apparel 
Manufacturers of South Africa (AMSA) -- defend the compliance drive as a 
struggle for survival. According to the NBC compliance manager, non-
compliant firms are „taking business away from compliant firms whose 
existence is being threatened, so we cannot allow the situation to continue‟ 
(quoted in Bisseker, 2010). Johann Baard, the head of AMSA, also portrayed 
the situation as a zero-sum game, claiming it was „unconscionable‟ to „sacrifice 
a complying industry employing tens of thousands of workers under conditions 
of “decent work” so that employees of non-complaint employers can remain 
employed in oppressive circumstances‟ (ibid). Such claims are blatantly 
implausible. AMSA members have long co-existed in the presence of low wage 
firms in South Africa. Destroying the low-wage firms in South Africa will 
benefit firms in China and Lesotho, not AMSA members. AMSA‟s support for 
the compliance drive should be interpreted as a means of putting pressure on 
government and Sactwu (via the associated job losses and resultant public 
outcry) to agree to a new „wage model‟ with more room for productivity-linked 
pay (discussed further below).    
 
Labour-intensive producers are particularly sensitive to wage increases. 
According to the 2008 manufacturing survey, wage costs in the clothing 
industry comprise 19 per cent of total expenditure, almost double that for 
manufacturing as a whole (StatsSA, 2010). But in low-wage areas like 
Newcastle, this figure is substantially higher: for the four Newcastle-based 
Applicants in the High Court case who were in business in 2008, the proportion 





producer) to 61 per cent (a cut-make-and-trim (CMT) enterprise).
7
 Raising 
minimum wages, especially in the presence of intensifying international 
competition, has a huge impact on profit margins, which are already tight in one 
of the most competitive clothing industries in the world.
8
   
 
International competition has been a key factor driving structural change in the 
clothing industry across Africa (Brooks and Simon, 2012). Tariff protection on 
imported South African clothing fell from 84 per cent in 1995 to 40 per cent in 
2002 (Skinner and Valodia, 2002: 59). Initially, the rapid depreciation of the 
Rand between 2000 and 2002 helped to sustain competitiveness as tariffs fell. 
Figure 2 shows that both the real effective exchange rate (the value to 
consumers of imported goods) and the dollar cost of wages fell sharply in 2001 
and 2002, to the benefit of South African producers.  
 
In response to their improved competitiveness in international markets, many 
clothing manufacturers reneged on their orders from domestic retailers, opting 
instead for lucrative export contracts. South Africa‟s retailers scrambled for 
alternatives, and „discovered‟ China -- a major low-wage clothing producer 
which has dominated the international clothing trade since joining the World 
Trade Organisation in 2001 and the expiration of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement 
in 2005 (Morris and Einhorn, 2008). When the Rand strengthened again from 
2003, South Africa‟s clothing exports collapsed. Imports of clothing rose 
sharply, especially from China, despite an increased tariff on imported clothing 
and temporary restrictions on Chinese imports in 2007 and 2008. By 2010, 
three-quarters of South Africa‟s clothing imports were from China (AMSA, 
2011: 1) where labour costs per unit of output are half that in South Africa 
(Morris and Barnes, 2009).   
 
The collapse in clothing employment would have been much worse if many of 
the low-wage producers had shut down due to an inability to comply with the 
NBC minimum wage. But non-compliance came at the cost of chronic conflict 
with the NBC.  
 
All firms in the clothing industry are legally obliged to register with the NBC 
and to comply with any collective agreement extended by the Minister of 
Labour to non-parties. In the first 18 months of its existence, the NBC‟s 
compliance officer investigated almost 1 400 firms and issued non-compliance 
notices against almost 1 000 of them (Anstey, 2004: 1859). Its campaign against 
non-compliant firms continued intermittently, resulting in factory closures and 
job losses (LEP, 2010: 162). The 2010/11 compliance drive is the latest chapter 
                                                 
7
 Information obtained from firm-level annual financial reports.   
8
 According to the 2008 manufacturing census, profit margins are 0.5% in clothing as opposed to 8% in 





in this saga -- although the stakes have risen considerably, and the very 
constitutionality of some aspects of South Africa‟s wage setting machinery is 
now being reviewed in court.  
 
 




The five Applicants in this court case are so-called „Chinese‟ producers, in that 
they originate from Taiwan, Hong Kong or China. Originally recruited by the 
municipality in the 1980s and 1990s to create jobs, Chinese producers brought 
with them the skills and networks needed to operate at the very labour-intensive 
end of the clothing industry (Todes, 1998). By the 2010s, they had come to 
form a settled „Chinese‟ community.    
 
During the 1970s, Newcastle underwent a rapid process of industrialisation. 
Manufacturing jobs expanded from 5 023 in 1970 to 19 514 in 1982, accounting 
for 49 per cent of the Gross Geographic Product (Robbins et al., 2004: 13). 
Over half of these jobs were provided by the steel giant, ISCOR. In response to 
ISCOR‟s plans for further expansion of the steelworks, the Newcastle town 
council invested heavily in roads, housing and related infrastructure. When 
ISCOR cancelled its plans, Newcastle was left with over 600 vacant houses, 
2 000 serviced plots, and a shrinking industrial base (Hart, 2002: 146). The 
town council responded by developing a strategy to lure East Asian (initially 
Taiwanese) clothing firms to the area (Todes, 1998).  
 
The municipal officials responsible for economic development visited Taiwan, 
Hong Kong and China many times, meeting with prospective investors and 
visiting factories. The key official learned basic Mandarin. His business card is 
still printed in English on one side and in Mandarin on the other. The strategy 
worked in part because of the generous subsidies on offer through the 1982 
Regional Industrial Development Program (RIDP), an Apartheid-era industrial 
decentralisation program. Other inducements included cheap, high-quality real 
estate and large supplies of low-wage labour in adjacent townships (created in 
large part through forced removals off farms in the 1960s and 1970s). As a 
result of these efforts, by 1996, clothing and knitwear had become the mainstay 
of manufacturing in Newcastle, accounting for 11 295 jobs (Robbins et al., 
2004: 15). The core of large Taiwanese firms soon attracted other, often 
smaller, family-linked firms to Newcastle, and a highly networked form of 
production soon developed. Knitting, assembly and embroidery were often done 
in different firms, replicating the kind of familial management systems and 
networks found in Taiwan (Hart, 2002: 183-4). CMT operations also sprang up, 
                                                 
9
 This section draws on secondary literature and on interviews with local government officials, factory owners 





producing basic items such as sleepwear, uniforms, jeans, skirts and shirts, with 
factories often sharing orders and outsourcing particular tasks.   
 
Chinese immigration (initially from Taiwan and Hong Kong, but from 1998 
also from mainland China and Singapore) continued long after the RIDP 
incentives were phased out in the early 1990s. A vibrant community developed: 
Newcastle has several Chinese restaurants, a Buddhist temple, a Chinese night 
school, two Chinese chambers of business (one politically pro-Taiwan, the other 
with members from China, Taiwan and Hong Kong), and a „Welcome to 
Newcastle‟ obelisk at the city limits in Mandarin and English. Strong links 
remain with their countries of origin, but for many of those in the clothing 
sector, Newcastle is home in a very real sense. They own houses, factories and 
participate in local politics (including at least two individuals who have been 
elected town councillors). Many have become South African citizens and have 
children born and schooled in South Africa.  
 
But their journey has had many twists and turns. The first economic shock was 
in 1991 when the RIDP (which had provided significant wage subsidies) came 
to an end and Wage Determination 471 came into effect, setting national 
minimum wages in clothing on a regionally differentiated basis. Many ignored 
the wage determination, however; by 1995 Sactwu had over 30 labour disputes 
with firms in Newcastle, and its then General Secretary, Ebrahim Patel, said he 
would „eat these fly-by-nights for breakfast‟ (in Hart, 2002: 166). Later, as 
Minister of Economic Development (from 2009), he supported South Africa‟s 
industrial policy direction which provides incentives for industrial upgrading, 
conditional on compliance with legislated minimum wages (see e.g. DTI, 2011). 
The clear thrust of post-Apartheid industrial policy for the clothing industry is 
to shift it towards the more capital-intensive, sophisticated end of the clothing 
market (further discussed below). There is simply no place in this approach for 
low-wage, labour-intensive production. 
 
The second major shock was wage setting through the NBC and the 
appreciation of the Rand from 2003. This had serious implications for the large 
Taiwanese producers, many of which produced for the export market. Richfin, a 
large Taiwanese-owned knitwear producer, applied to the Industrial 
Development Corporation (IDC) to reschedule a loan, and, when this was 
refused, closed its doors, putting 1 660 people out of work. Nova Clothing, the 
first firm to relocate to Newcastle from Hong Kong, was issued a compliance 
order to pay legislated minimum wages and subsequently closed its doors, 
putting a further 1 600 people out of work. The owner had apparently instigated 
legal proceedings against the government over the creation of the NBC, but 





and left South Africa.
10
 He, like many other Chinese producers, was concerned 
about the power of the NBC to seize property and assets of firms that were not 
paying the prescribed minimum wage (Robbins et al, 2004: 22-3). Other large 
employers that closed during this period included Welcome Textiles and 
Nantex, which respectively put 450 and 2 000 people out of work. 
 
This signalled the effective death of Newcastle‟s clothing export industry. From 
2003, almost all of the remaining producers concentrated on the low- and 
middle-income domestic market, competing directly with imports from 
countries like Lesotho and China. Some registered with the NBC and paid 
various dues -- including an „agency fee‟ from 2006 which raised wage costs by 
10 per cent -- but did not comply with the minimum wage agreement, although 
some raised their minimum wages in an effort to get closer to the legal 
minimum. Others attempted to avoid the NBC altogether, an increasingly 
untenable strategy given the compliance drive.    
 
The Newcastle Chinese feel betrayed by the transformed policy environment 
and by what they perceive to be racist slurs (for example, calling them „fly-by-
nights‟ when they regard Newcastle as their home). They also felt that there was 
a failure to understand how difficult it is to compete at the bottom of the 
clothing market. In this highly competitive environment, missed deadlines can 
turn a small profit into a major loss as fines are imposed and orders cancelled. 
Some owners live on their factory premises, mobilising their family to work 
long hours in the factory if a deadline is in danger of being missed; for instance, 
Mr Cheng, the owner of Lucky Industry, died of a heart attack late one night in 
2011 as he worked five knitting machines trying to complete an order. These 
pressures have also sometimes resulted in labour practices that are clearly 
abusive, such as locking workers in the factory. In one particularly infamous 
case from 2001, a worker on a night shift gave birth prematurely to twins -- both 
of whom died because the owner could not be reached and relatives could not 
access the locked factory (Newman, 2005). It was an incident that prompted the 
Department of Labour to inspect Newcastle clothing factories, finding other 
instances of abuse (ibid). It also prompted Sactwu to launch its „operation clean-
up‟ to end „sweatshop conditions‟ in the area.
11
   
 
Ten years on, some Newcastle firms still do not fully comply with the Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act (Kriel, 2012; Gina, 2012) and, according to the 
NBC‟s 2010 list of „known non-compliant‟ firms, some were paying less than 
half the NBC minimum wage. For Sactwu, this is „simply irreconcilable with 
                                                 
10
 Information supplied by Ferdie Alberts, interviewed 14 June 2011.  
11






the work environment contemplated by our labour legislation and our 
Constitution‟ (Gina, 2011: par 10-11).  
 
It is important, however, to recognise some complexity in the patterns of 
conditions of service which is not fully captured by asking only if firms pay the 
minimum wage. Some firms provide small payments to their workers during the 
off-season (a practice they would likely stop if they paid higher wages). Others 
have experimented with worker co-operatives and various forms of 
productivity-linked pay. One model is to pay bonuses for production over and 
above a basic quota; another is to offer low basic weekly wages but to 
supplement them with piece-work payments. These practices can result in 
significant variation in earnings. According to wage records for 2011, take-
home pay for workers employed by one of the Applicants in the case (a CMT 
firm) ranged from 15 per cent below the NBC minimum wage to almost double 
it.  
 
There is, therefore, no simple correlation between minimum weekly wages and 
total earnings, and not all workers would necessarily benefit if wages rose to the 
prescribed minimum but productivity-linked pay was reduced. Indeed, when 
one of the Applicants in the court case (the jersey producer) attempted to 
increase his minimum wages to 70 per cent of the legal minimum, he could only 
do so by reducing his piece-work bonuses. His most productive (and best paid) 
workers resigned in protest at their reduced total earnings. 
 
  
The Compliance Drive, Industrial Policy and Job 
Destruction  
 
By the end of 2009, the NBC was taking action against over 400 clothing 
factories, mostly in low-wage areas of KZN (especially Newcastle), Botshabelo 
and QwaQwa. This involved obtaining arbitration awards (made orders of the 
Labour Court in terms of section 143 of the Labour Relations Act), followed by 
writs of execution (implemented on instruction by the local sheriff). Many writs 
were obtained but not fully executed, as NBC officials sought agreements with 
firms over payments of dues and pension fund contributions owed to the NBC, 
as well as wages owed to workers. For firms that had been non-compliant for 
many years, the amounts owing in terms of back-pay and NBC contributions 
were substantial and self-evidently impossible to honour fully.
12
 There was, 
therefore, some room for negotiation, although the high current cost of 
compliance remained the major sticking point.     
                                                 
12
 According to an audit done in September 2009, R40 million was owed in arrear payments to workers in non-






Some owners engaged in elaborate cat-and-mouse games with the NBC as they 
begged for time to implement the minimum wage, while completing their 
existing orders and simultaneously making plans to shut down their companies. 
Some opened new businesses, sometimes in different locations, forcing the 
NBC to begin the process anew. They also leased machinery from other 
factories to avoid having these assets attached. Others downsized to micro-
enterprises (employing five or fewer workers) in order to obtain an automatic 
exemption from the minimum wage, or re-organised themselves as 
cooperatives.  
 
For example, Alex Liu, the chairman of the Newcastle Chinese Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry (henceforth „the Chinese Chamber‟) and key 
spokesman for the Chinese clothing firms, shut down his clothing firm Win-
Cool in 2008 but was prompted by his parents and ex-workers to start up again. 
He decided the only way this could be done was to set up a co-operative 
(Simunye) which would fall under the Co-operatives Act, rather than the NBC, 
to supply orders sourced through Win-Cool (Payne, 2011). In 2011, workers in 
the co-operative earned a basic „wage‟ of R250 plus productivity-linked pay, 
which pushed earnings for some as high as R630 a week (well over the R489 
NBC minimum wage). The NBC, however, takes a dim view of both the wages 
paid and the WinCool/Simunye structure, and has taken Liu to court several 
times. But as of 2013, Win-Cool/Simunye remains in operation.  
 
In 2010, the NBC compliance manager drew up a list of 65 priority „offenders‟ 
and acted decisively against them. By the end of July, the sheriffs had executed 
13 writs in metro areas and 12 in non-metro areas, nine of which were in 
Newcastle.
13
 In August, the NBC ramped up the process, shutting down a 
further 14 firms in Newcastle and QwaQwa (Khanyile, 2011). Employers and 
workers alike were alarmed by the precipitous job destruction. When the 
sheriffs shut down Wintong Manufacturing in Newcastle, factory workers 
protested vociferously (Dugger, 2010). The Chinese Chamber added its voice to 
the protest and 85 clothing firms closed in solidarity. Sactwu asked the courts to 
intervene, arguing that this amounted to an illegal lockout.  Negotiations led to 
the re-opening of the factories (including Wintong) and a series of meetings 
between the Department of Labour, the Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI), the NBC, AMSA and various ad hoc representatives of firms that were 
not party to NBC agreements and were also not compliant with their terms 
(Chen, 2011: par 54).   
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Although the parties to these meetings committed themselves to finding a 
solution that was acceptable to everyone, they failed to do so. Many of the non-
party firms, mostly in KZN, organised themselves into a new association -- the 
United Clothing and Textile Association (UCTA), chaired by Ahmed Paruk and 
Alex Liu (deputy) -- which proposed a new wage model for the entire industry. 
This would allow for lower minimum wages supplemented by piece-work or 
productivity-linked pay. At this meeting, AMSA, the Cape-based employers 
association that had helped launch the compliance drive in the first place, 
announced an „alliance‟ with the Chinese Chamber, saying that there was a 
„need for a new minimum wage dispensation in the industry because of the job 
losses and closures‟ and to „change the current law‟.
14
 This was rejected by 
Sactwu, however, and later that month, it presented its „Worst Employer 
Award‟ to the Chinese Chamber in the form of a broken brick, symbolising 




By November 2010, 26 factories in Newcastle had been closed down (Chen, 
2011: para 52). In December, following substantial adverse publicity about job 
losses, the NBC accepted a proposal from the Coastal Clothing Manufacturers 
Association (the so-called „22 December resolution‟) for a phased-in period of 
compliance. A „moratorium‟ on proceeding with writs of execution against non-
compliant companies was implemented, and Ebrahim Patel announced that non-
compliant firms would not have to comply immediately with the minimum 
wage. Instead, they had to become 70 per cent compliant by 31 March 2011, 90 
per cent compliant by 1 January 2012 and 100 per cent compliant by 30 April 
2012 (Chen, 2011: par 58). All arrears (back-pay, NBC levies etc.) owed by 
firms were suspended and deemed payable only if the firm broke the phase-in 
agreement, or became non-compliant after 30 April 2012.   
 
That Patel was in charge of this process rather than the Minister of Labour, 
under whose remit this process more naturally falls, reflects the additional 
resources he was able to mobilise through his co-ordinating role as Minister of 
Economic Development -- especially various DTI support programmes and 
production incentives. The DTI also encouraged clothing firms to make use of 
various government industrial policy programmes to upgrade production 
processes. The Clothing and Textile Competitiveness Improvement Programme 
(CTCIP), for example, assists the large clothing producers to upgrade skills and 
production capacity and to develop stronger and more co-operative links with 
suppliers in the CMT sector.
16
 A key requirement of the programme is that all 
parties comply with the requirements of the NBC agreement. The DTI also 
offers production incentives (worth 10 per cent of value-added) to help fund 
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  Minutes of the meeting chaired by Les Kettledas of the Department of Labour, 20 September 2010. 
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capital-investment. These, too, are only available to those who comply with the 




It is important to recognise that making themselves eligible for these 
programmes and making use of them would tend to increase firms‟ capital-
intensity and, because of their higher wage costs, shift them towards the higher-
income consumer market. Or, as the DTI puts it, the CTCIP is:  
 
„aimed at helping the industry upgrade its processes, products and 
people. This is expected to move the industry up the value chain to 
activities that are far more sustainable than competing against 
“sweatshop” labour practices and pervasive government subsidization 
in other developing countries‟ (2010: 6). 
 
Unsurprisingly, given Patel‟s erstwhile leadership of Sactwu, this is in line with 
Sactwu‟s understanding of „decent work‟ as being only those jobs in the top end 
of the clothing industry. In his defence of the NBC, Andre Kriel, the current 
General Secretary of Sactwu, quotes approvingly from a DTI document which 
argued that:  
 
„a policy that seeks to base competitiveness on low wages would not 
be consistent with South Africa‟s human rights culture. On the 
contrary, sustainable human resources policies will allow the industry 
to compete in the market for high fashion and technical garments and 
textiles and to deliver innovative, quality products that require well 
trained and productive workers‟ (Kriel, 2012: par 57).  
 
There is no place in this vision for the labour-intensive production of basic 
goods for lower-income consumers or the mass market. It implies that if the 
industry is to exist at all, firms must compete only in the „high fashion‟, 
technical/quality end of the business. The destruction of low-wage labour-
intensive firms is thus explicitly part of the DTI/Sactwu structural adjustment 
programme for the industry.   
 
Patel reported in February 2012 that 100 South African clothing firms were 
benefitting from the DTI‟s incentive programmes, to the tune of R1 billion 
(Crotty, 2012). These are sizable incentives averaging R10 million a firm, and 
equivalent to R18 000 per worker in firms registered with the NBC. They are, in 
other words, double the 2008 estimate of the investment costs associated with 
each job in the industry.  







Moreover, some firms received more than R10 million from the DTI; Seardel, 
which is part-owned by Sactwu,
18
 received R98,6 million in production 
incentives, almost all related to its apparel manufacturing, in the three years 
prior to March 2012.
19
  Ironically, Seardel has a manufacturing plant in Lesotho, 
which means that Sactwu benefits indirectly, via its shareholdings, from low-
wage production there. Sactwu has publicly defended its indirect shareholding 
in a low-wage producer in Lesotho, in part on the basis that it is compliant with 
Lesotho‟s minimum wage legislation -- even though minimum wages in 
Lesotho are significantly lower than the wages paid in the non-compliant firms 




The DTI, in its most recent Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP), claims that its 
various support programs have „effectively stabilised a deeply vulnerable 
sector‟ (DTI, 2011: 17), which would be a very poor achievement for a 
government supposedly committed to rapidly increasing the number of people 
in employment. By the same token, in late 2010, Sactwu celebrated a „reduction 
in job losses‟, because the 30 000 jobs lost between 2007 and 2010 were fewer 
than in the preceding three years.
21
 One year later, in late 2011, Sactwu 
celebrated a further „significant slowdown in retrenchments in the industry‟,
22
 
which the union attributed primarily to the DTI‟s support. Indeed, Sactwu‟s 
research director, Etienne Vlok, echoed the DTI, suggesting that the industry 
had „stabilised‟ due to the government‟s productivity-oriented industrial policies 
(Vlok, 2012). As late as July 2012, the DTI was claiming that upgrading and 
compliance with minimum wages was a „win-win‟ strategy that „supports a race 
to the top that is based on product, process and people upgrading‟, and that as a 
consequence productivity had grown and employment stabilised (Steyn, 2012).  
 
It turned out, however, that the DTI‟s and Sactwu‟s confidence was premature. 
Between 2010 and 2012, Seardel retrenched 40 per cent of the workforce in its 
apparel and household textile operations. Seardel‟s total employment in its 
clothing division dropped from almost 9,000 in 2010 to just over 5,000 in 2012 
(Seardel, 2012: 15). Seardel closed down Intimate Apparel in Cape Town, with 
800 job losses. Intimate Apparel had been supplying the upmarket chain 
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 Sactwu owns 38% of Hoskins Consolidated Investments (HCI) which owns Seardel. Sactwu also has a small 
holding of Seardel shares on its own account. Together, Sactwu‟s stake in Seardel is 30% of all shares 
(calculated from the 2012 Seardel annual report).  
19
 Clothing Industry sheds jobs, 17 February, 2012: http://www.hci.co.za/clothing-textile/clothing-industry-
sheds-jobs/.  According to Seardel‟s 2012 annual report, the apparel section got R67 million from the DTI‟s 
customised sector program for the clothing industry in the „period under review‟, presumably meaning 2011-12. 
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 „Union owns stake in sweatshop‟, by Anna-Marie Lombard, City Press, 20
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 Sactwu press release, „Clothing and textile industry job losses slow down‟, 4
th
 October 2010; 
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Woolworths and was not facing competition from Newcastle producers.
23
 It also 
shut down its men‟s suits unit in Durban. In 2012 it announced a further 1,500 
retrenchments in Cape Town -- which the company called a „high-wage metro 
area‟ -- and Ladysmith in KZN.
24
 Trubok likewise announced it would be 
retrenching 400 workers (Steyn, 2012).  
 
There appear, therefore, to be no grounds for optimism that the DTI/Sactwu 
vision of a high-wage, high-productivity, high-fashion, top-quality „decent 
work‟ strategy will create anything like the number of jobs that are possible 
with the low-wage, labour-intensive model currently under threat in Newcastle. 
Indeed, Sactwu‟s stance amounts to a celebration of job-destroying structural 
adjustment away from low-wage, labour-intensive production.   
 
In March 2011, the Financial Mail reported that at least 250 clothing firms in 
Durban, Newcastle, QwaQwa and Botshabelo would not be able to meet the 70 
per cent target and 28 000 jobs were under threat (Bisseker, 2011). AMSA‟s 
Johann Baard told the reporter that this was to be expected „because we know 
what it costs to run a factory and the industry‟s cost structure does not match the 
prices the retailers want‟, adding that „with almost half the industry non-
compliant, it is clear that as an industry we have priced ourselves out of the 
market… Non-compliance reflects that the industry wage model has been 
overtaken by competitive global market realities‟ (quoted in Bisseker, 2011). 
There is a certain irony here, given that AMSA and the NBC, which had 
managed to restrain real minimum wage growth in metro areas since 2000, have 
helped drive up labour costs in non-metro areas and for employers who are not 
represented at the NBC. AMSA, however, is happy to use the loss of jobs in 
Newcastle to help justify a recalibration of the industry‟s wage model. Thus, in 
a later interview, Baard observed that AMSA‟s support for the compliance drive 
was born out of frustration:  
 
„It is not that we are uncaring, we are left with no alternative. It would 
be different if the unions, Cosatu, the politicians and Luthuli House 
had the will. We need to re-invent the wage dispensation in the 
country‟ (quoted in Planting, 2011).  
 
AMSA‟s call for a new wage dispensation, whatever its merits, did not affect 
the requirement that non-compliant firms become compliant. However, some 
members of UCTA -- the Newcastle-based employers association -- applied to 
the NBC for exemptions from the minimum wage on grounds of financial 
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hardship but were turned down (Enslin-Payne, 2011). This is typical of South 
Africa‟s bargaining councils, which rarely grant exemptions from the minimum 
wage and which contribute to undermining labour-intensive growth elsewhere 
in the economy (Nattrass and Seekings, 2012b). The NBC in the clothing 
industry does not grant any exemptions from minimum wages, according to the 
most recent report available (which is for 2008),
25
 and it stopped hearing 
exemption applications in 2010.  
 
Relations between the NBC and Newcastle firms worsened in March 2011 
when, on the day that Alex Liu was attending a meeting with the NBC, assets of 
his and eleven other Newcastle factories were attached for their failure to 
register with the NBC and pay over back-pay and outstanding NBC levies 
(Enslin-Payne, 2011). The NBC compliance manager denied that the timing had 
been deliberate, saying that „Alex has been giving us the run-around‟ and that it 
had taken the NBC two weeks to find his new premises (ibid). Later that year, 
the sheriff attached machinery and removed it from the premises of a firm 
belonging to the head of the Newcastle Clothing and Textile Association. 
Employers threatened to lock out workers in protest but did not do so because 
the legal requirements for a lock-out had not been met (Chen, 2011b: par 73).  
 
In June 2011, following the issue of further compliance orders, five Newcastle 
firms and the UCTA launched their legal action against the NBC and the 
Minister of Labour. The firms were subject to on-going harassment and 
intimidation, including threats from the sheriff to remove assets and close them 
down (Chen, 2011b). By mid-July, writs had been issued to 109 companies 
across South Africa, affecting 6 400 employees (Planting, 2011). The following 
month, Sactwu held a protest march in Newcastle, calling on the NBC to 
enforce the collective agreement on non-complaint firms and for the application 
to the High Court to be withdrawn. Several factories, including one of the 
applicants in the court case, were inspected (or raided) by a joint team from the 
Department of Labour, the Department of Home Affairs and Sactwu. Sactwu 
released a press statement entitled „Human and labour rights violations 
exposed‟, complaining mainly about the toilet facilities in factories, the 
employment of undocumented workers, and irregularities with regard to 
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 These findings were disputed by the 
Newcastle employers involved as applicants in the court case, who described 
them as selective, unfair and „designed to cast the Applicants in a negative light‟ 
(Chen, 2011b: par 72). 
 
In November 2011, the five Newcastle court applicants launched an urgent 
application to prevent the NBC from holding them to the collective agreement 
until such time as their court case was heard. Although this was unsuccessful, 
the sheriffs took no further action against the firms in 2012. The reasons for this 
are unclear, but it is likely that the adverse publicity generated over the 
Newcastle clothing employment crisis was important here. Events were covered 
in all the major South African papers and on television, with a story appearing 
even in the New York Times. In August 2011, it was also the subject of a cabinet 
briefing where the Minister of Finance, Pravin Gordhan, suggested that changes 
to South Africa‟s labour dispensation may be necessary to prevent further job 
losses in the clothing sector. His comments were subsequently endorsed by 
Trevor Manuel, a previous Minister of Finance and current head of South 




In an attempt to force the issue, AMSA approached the Labour Court in July 
2012, seeking an order to compel the NBC to act on the 450 writs of execution 
which had been issued but not served. In a bizarre twist, Sactwu initially 
opposed the application, even filing papers arguing that the union was in favour 
of living wages but not the closure of factories. A few days later, the union had 
had a rethink and abandoned the case. Sactwu General Secretary Andre Kriel 
told journalists, „If we oppose AMSA‟s court application it creates the 
perception that the union condones non-compliance. We do not.‟ (quoted in 
Planting, 2012). But Sactwu was clearly uncomfortable about being associated 
with an action that could clearly and directly be linked to the loss of thousands 
of jobs.  
 
Figures 3 and 4 indicate the number of jobs threatened by the NBC compliance 
drive in non-metro KZN, Free State and Northern region, and in Metro KZN.
28
 
They show the cumulative number of recorded jobs in the listed non-compliant 
firms according to the lowest wages paid in each firm, first for non-metro areas 
in KZN, the Free State and Northern areas (Figure 3), and second for metro 
KZN (Figure 4). In other areas, very few firms with very few employees were 
listed as non-compliant in terms of paying minimum wages.
29
  






 There are a further 600 workers employed by listed firms paying below the relevant minima in metro Free 
State and metro Northern region not included in the figures. 
29
 The handful of non-compliant firms in Camperdown and Umzinto, where minimum wages are set at an 






Figure 3 shows, for example, that there were 1 250 workers in factories where 
the lowest wage in practice was R200 a week or less in non-metro Free State, in 
2010/11. There were also about 1 400 workers in the same position in non-
metro KZN. About 4 000 workers were employed in factories where the lowest 
wage was R300 or less in the non-metro Free State, more than 3 200 in non-
metro KZN, and about 800 in non-metro Northern region. In total, about 5 100 
workers were employed in KZN factories where the lowest wage was less than 
the official minimum wage for non-metro areas (i.e. R412.50, as extended by 
the Minister of Labour with effect from 1 January 2011), about 5 400 in 
factories in the Free State, and about 1 050 in factories in the Northern region, 
giving a total of about 11,600 workers. Most of these jobs would be under threat 
if the minimum wage was enforced, because the low profit margins in the sector 
left firms with little room to manoeuver. If a minimum wage of 90 per cent of 
the current prescribed minimum were enforced, then about 10 200 of these jobs 
would still be under threat. If a minimum wage of R300 per week was enforced, 
then about 8 000 workers would be under threat.  
 
It is important to note that these figures include only workers employed in firms 
known to the NBC. It is likely that most of the (predominantly informal) firms 
not known to the NBC were also paying below the official minimum wage -- 
and so jobs in these firms would also come under threat if or when they were 




Figure 3: Employment by lowest wage paid, listed firms, non-metro: 





























Figure 4: Employment by lowest wage paid, listed firms, metro KZN 
 
 
Figure 4 shows that, in metro KZN, listed non-compliant firms paying wages 
below R684.25 (i.e. the minimum scheduled with effect from 22 March 2010) 
employed a total of about 4 500 workers. Most of these jobs would also be 
under threat if the minimum wage was applied. Taken together, Figures 3 and 4 
(plus the approximately 600 workers in metro Free State and Northern regions, 
not shown) suggest that the compliance drive threatened at least 16 700 jobs in 
listed firms in non-metro and metro areas.  
 
It is also important to note that these figures reflect all the workers in the non-
compliant firms, but it is not clear if all of them receive wages below the legal 
minimum. Even if only a minority of employees are paid less than the 
minimum, raising them would impact on margins, throwing the viability of 
some businesses into question. It is, however, impossible to determine the 
precise number of jobs which would be lost if the minimum wage was enforced, 
as some producers may be able to improve efficiency (this is typically done by 
shedding unskilled workers and becoming more capital-intensive) and stay in 
business with a smaller workforce producing different products. However, 
given existing low profit margins, skills shortages and strong competition from 
countries like China, it is probable that most labour-intensive producers of basic 
clothing items will simply cease production and perhaps even become 
importers. In Newcastle, for example, several factory shops already stock more 






















In addition, the estimate of almost 10 000 potential job losses in listed firms in 
KZN (and 16 700 jobs nationally) ignores another source of possible further job 
losses in that the enforcement of minimum wages on non-compliant firms might 
have indirect effects on compliant firms. A handful of large compliant 
employers in the Newcastle area, for example, currently pay the gazetted 
minimum wage, producing for niche markets, using capital-intensive processes 
and are not threatened by the low-wage Chinese firms nearby. They do, 
however, draw many of their employees from the non-compliant firms which 
act, in effect, as outsourced training institutions (see Nattrass and Seekings 
2012a). If the non-compliant businesses in Newcastle close their doors, the 
remaining firms would ultimately find themselves having to provide more basic 
training, thereby raising their production costs in the longer term. Shutting 
down the low-wage labour-intensive firms will also reduce employment and 
incomes in the area, thereby lowering demand and threatening jobs in others 





The struggle of Newcastle‟s clothing producers to remain in business is 
symptomatic of the difficulties involved in promoting labour-intensive growth 
in South Africa. They have to contend with minimum wages set in bargaining 
councils dominated by unionised firms in metro areas, firms which produce for 
the more expensive, higher-quality, fast-fashion end of the clothing market (and 
hence have more room to pay higher wages). They are unable to benefit from 
the DTI‟s support programmes, as these require firms to be compliant with the 
minimum wages at the outset. Furthermore, by assisting firms to improve their 
competitiveness through upgrading machinery and retraining workers, such 
programmes raise the firms‟ capital-intensity and shift producers out of the kind 
of low-wage, low-productivity forms of employment necessary to absorb 
unskilled, unemployed South Africans.    
 
The Sactwu/DTI vision is that only „decent‟ (i.e. relatively high-wage, high-
productivity) jobs should exist in South Africa, and that labour-market and 
industrial policies should prevent any low-wage, low-productivity production as 
this is supposedly a „low-road‟ to growth. This assumption has underpinned the 
post-Apartheid government‟s growth strategy (Nattrass, 2001; Nattrass, 2011), 
but the hoped for „high-road‟ of substantial job creation through skill- and 
capital-intensive growth has yet to materialise -- and the costs have been borne 
by workers in labour-intensive industry.  
 
South Africa needs a more differentiated approach to wage-setting that enforces 





if low basic wages can be supplemented with productivity-linked pay. Policies 
that assume, incorrectly, that we need to drive out low-wage, low-productivity 
employment in order to support higher-wage, higher-productivity forms of 
production, fail to appreciate that there are different product markets in 
clothing. Allowing low-wage producers in places like Newcastle to continue to 
exist will not harm jobs in the upper-end of the industry. Instead, it will 
accommodate the needs of lower-skilled workers -- the unemployed and poorer 
consumers who purchase basic clothing goods rather than pricier, branded, fast-
fashion products.   
 
The Minister‟s successive extensions of the Collective Agreement and resulting 
job losses puts paid to the argument that South Africa‟s bargaining councils do 
not affect employment. The Newcastle case illustrates how South Africa‟s 
labour-market institutions and industrial policies can be used by an unholy 
coalition of a trade union, metro-based and more capital-intensive firms, and the 
state to inflict job-destroying structural adjustment on the industry. They do so 
under the guise of promoting „decent work‟ and a level playing field for 
producers, but the result is that clothing jobs are exported to low-wage countries 
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The Centre for Social Science Research 
 
The CSSR is an umbrella organisation comprising four research units:  
 
The AIDS and Society Research Unit (ASRU) supports innovative research into 
the social dimensions of AIDS in South Africa. Special emphasis is placed on 
exploring the interface between qualitative and quantitative research. Focus areas 
include: AIDS policy in South Africa, AIDS-stigma, sexual relationships in the age of 
AIDS, the social and economic factors influencing disclosure (of HIV-status to 
others), the interface between traditional medicine and biomedicine, the international 
treatment rollout, global health citisenship, and the impact of providing antiretroviral 
treatment on individuals and households. 
 
The Democracy in Africa Research Unit (DARU) supports students and scholars 
who conduct systematic research in the following four areas: public opinion and 
political culture in Africa and its role in democratisation and consolidation; elections 
and voting in Africa; the development of legislative institutions; and the impact of the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic on democratisation in Southern Africa. DARU has also 
developed close working relationships with projects such as the Afrobarometer (a 
cross-national survey of public opinion in fifteen African countries) and the 
Comparative National Elections Project, which conducts post-election surveys over 
20 countries across the world. 
 
The Sustainable Societies Unit’s (SSU) mission is to explore the social and 
institutional dimensions of economic development and the interaction between 
human society and the natural world. Focus areas include: winners and losers in 
South African economic growth and the interplay between ecological and economic 
concerns. The SSU was previously known as the Social Surveys Unit and still works 
on a number of survey projects, including the Cape Area Panel Study. 
 
 
 
 
